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This study investigates the imitative use of management practices across a
multitier supply network. Although imitation may take the form of any
management practice, operationally, we focus on whether the buyer’s con-
trol practices used with first-tier suppliers results in similar control prac-
tices being used by these first-tier suppliers with the second-tier suppliers.
Drawing on institutional theory, we identify relational context (i.e., affec-
tive commitment) and environmental context (i.e., environmental uncer-
tainty) as two important factors influencing the extent to which such
imitation takes place. Using unique survey data of vertically linked supply
chain triads, we generally find support for the occurrence of imitation and
more so in cases of high affective commitment. The results regarding envi-
ronmental uncertainty further reveal selectivity in imitative behavior, call-
ing attention to the level of deliberateness in imitation decisions in
supply networks. Besides contributing to theory on imitative behaviors in
the supply chain, this study also generates practical implications on the
spread of management practices across multiple tiers.
Keywords: buyer/supplier relationships; supplier management; organizational learn-
ing and knowledge acquisition; survey methods; regression analysis
INTRODUCTION
Companies are increasingly concerned with creating
strategies for managing complex supply chains and
are working toward intensified collaboration with sup-
ply chain partners. Despite a growing interest in the
management of supply chain networks, what happens
within multitier supply chains, and, particularly, how
one link affects another link, remains largely unex-
plored (Mena, Humphries, & Choi, 2013). This is an
important omission since firms embedded in such
networks of interconnected relationships are likely to
influence each other, rather than to operate in isola-
tion (Borgatti & Li, 2009). There are many aspects of
and mechanisms for this, but one prominent mecha-
nism is interorganizational imitation, where organiza-
tions mimic the practices of others (Ordanini, Rubera,
& DeFillippi, 2008). Although prior research has high-
lighted the value of imitation in explaining the usage
of supply chain management practices (Turkulainen,
Kauppi, & Nermes, 2017), we know very little about
January 2020
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
54
Journal of Supply Chain Management
2020, 56(1), 54–72
© 2019 The Authors. Journal of Supply Chain Management published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
its determinants. This study seeks to provide further
context regarding the imitation of practices across
multiple tiers in a given supply chain.
Our theoretical framework is guided by institutional
theory, which emphasizes the importance of an orga-
nization’s social context in the form of network
arrangements, and has led many to examine the
mimetic adoption of organizational practices (Brass,
Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). The diffusion of
management practices in supply chains has been
shown to operate through activation of network ties
when a focal firm is facing a highly complex environ-
ment and is uncertain about the best response (McFar-
land, Bloodgood, & Payan, 2008). Not all adoptions
of practices by others, however, carry equal weight for
a given firm’s adoptions. Organizations are more influ-
enced by organizations to which they are strongly tied
and about whom they have positive sentiments (Tate,
Ellram, & G€olgeci, 2013). We therefore argue that imi-
tation in supply chains is not devoid of relevant affec-
tive content and, more specifically, that imitation
increases with increased levels of affective commit-
ment. Moreover, given the context-dependent nature
of many supply chain practices (Sousa & Voss, 2008),
this study suggests that the common belief that envi-
ronmental uncertainty enhances imitation does not
apply to all types of management practices. Building
on organizational contingency theory, we posit that,
when faced with uncertainty, firms’ tendency to imitate
certain practices will be lessened or amplified depend-
ing on their relevance to the specific situation.
The overarching purpose of this research is, thus, to
understand how both relational and environmental con-
textual factors affect the imitation of supply chain man-
agement practices. Our general contention is that, while
network ties create the conditions for imitation to take
place, it is the level of affective commitment along with
environmental uncertainty that determines the extent of
imitation of management practices in the supply chain.
To test our expectations, we conducted a survey and
obtained a unique data set consisting of vertically
linked buyer–supplier–supplier triads. In our empirical
study, operationally, we focus specifically on control
practices imitation. The test design considers imitation
as an intended decision on the part of the first-tier
supplier in response to observing the buyer’s controls,
resulting in similar controls being used by the first-tier
supplier with the second-tier supplier.
By investigating imitation effects in this setting, our
study demonstrates the importance of considering influ-
ences from outside the buyer–supplier dyad and incor-
porating multiple tiers into our understanding of certain
supply chain management phenomena. This responds
to recent calls for more multilevel conceptualization and
research in supply chain management (e.g., Carter,
Meschnig, & Kaufmann, 2015b). Prior research has
noted, moreover, that in order to get a better grasp of the
use of supply chain management practices, the way orga-
nizations select supply chain management best practices
needs to be studied in more depth (Sousa & Voss,
2008). Applying theories that incorporate mimetic pro-
cesses is an important step in that direction, as it brings
new perspectives on the preferences that organizations
develop regarding certain practices, and how these pro-
cesses shape supply chain management patterns across
multiple tiers. Not only is the empirical literature on the
occurrence of imitation across multiple tiers quite lim-
ited in general, the questions of whom suppliers imitate,
when they are more or less prone to do so and, particu-
larly, whether suppliers are selective in what they imitate
under specific conditions have been left unanswered,
constituting the focus of this study.
Overall, our findings provide new insights on how
the relational context affects the transfer of organiza-
tional practices, with greater imitative behaviors being
found in situations where the supplier is more com-
mitted to the buyer firm. Moreover, while environ-
mental uncertainty is generally thought to increase
imitation, our study suggests that mimetic influence
depends on relevance judgments. The result is a selec-
tive imitation of supply chain management practices
to situations where this is considered most effective.
Importantly, while this study specifically tested for
control practices imitation, the insights from this
study have application to the imitation of other sup-
ply chain management practices as well.
From a practical standpoint, such insights should
improve firms’ recognition of their own but also their
supply chain partners’ imitative tendencies and, more
generally, contribute to a better understanding of the
enablers as well as barriers to spreading various man-
agement practices across the supply chain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
the next section, we review relevant literature and intro-
duce our research setting. We then outline the theoretical
framework and develop our hypotheses. The empirical
part of the study follows, including a description of the
sample and data collection, measurement validation,
analyses, and results. We conclude by discussing the aca-
demic and managerial relevance of the study, its limita-
tions, and directions for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH
SETTING
Interorganizational imitation occurs when the use of
certain practices by an organization increases the likeli-
hood of other organizations using similar practices
(Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Ordanini et al., 2008). One
of the most powerful sources of influence for imitative
behavior and mimetic processes is an organization’s
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network of ties (Brass et al., 2004; Soda, Zaheer, & Car-
lone, 2008). Studies have investigated interorganiza-
tional imitation in various network contexts. In the field
of operations and supply chain management, the work
has expanded from examining, for example, the adop-
tion of total quality management (e.g., Westphal, Gulati,
& Shortell, 1997), manufacturing practices (e.g., Ketokivi
& Schroeder, 2004), and risk management tools (e.g.,
Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz, 2005) to the diffusion of
environmental business practices (e.g., Tate et al., 2013),
supply chain technologies (e.g., Liu, Prajogo, & Oke,
2016), and the use of supplier integration mechanisms
(e.g., Turkulainen et al., 2017). Related work has shown
that interfirm linkages within the supply chain provide
an effective channel for the diffusion and imitation of
management practices (e.g., Fu, 2012), and evidence on
the spread of interfirm behaviors from one dyadic rela-
tionship to an adjacent dyadic relationship in the supply
chain has been found (e.g., McFarland et al., 2008; Reu-
sen & Stouthuysen, 2017). As the literature is only begin-
ning to uncover the imitation of management practices
across multiple tiers, the key motivation of this study is
to shed further light on the occurrence of such imitation
specifically in supply networks.
As noted in prior supply chain research, the smallest
unit of a network that captures interrelational influ-
ences is a triad (Choi & Wu, 2009a). Accordingly, we
consider a three-tier supply chain configuration in the
form of vertical buyer–supplier–supplier triads. Fig-
ure 1, adopted from Reusen and Stouthuysen (2017),
illustrates our research setting, which involves dyadic
relationships at two levels. The first-level dyad
involves the relationship between the buyer and its
first-tier supplier (S1). The second-level dyad involves
the relationship between the S1 and the second-tier
supplier (S2). This conceptualization corresponds to
an open triad as specified by Mena et al. (2013),
where the supplier in the middle (i.e., the S1) occu-
pies a mediating role. That is, we take the S1 as the
focal firm and study how the dyadic relationship
between the buyer and S1 influences the dyadic rela-
tionship between the S1 and S2. It is specifically
through the S1’s imitative tendencies that practices
used to manage relationships across the supply chain
tiers may come to resemble each other.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The proposed theoretical framework examines the
determinants of supply chain management practices imi-
tation and has an institutional theoretical foundation.
Institutional theory has been widely used in studying
imitative behavior, and network scholars have also
pointed to its value in a supply chain context (see for
example, Borgatti & Li, 2009). The central tenet of the
institutional argument is that organizations are affected
by other organizations and that imitation and the result-
ing isomorphism are key parts of organizational behav-
ior. Traditionally, institutional theory emphasizes social
influences on organizational behavior and suggests that
organizations copy practices adopted by others to
acquire legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). More
recent developments in institutional theory, however,
posit that mimickers may be economically motivated
and that imitation occurs in an attempt to improve effi-
ciency. According to this perspective, organizations
respond to indications that specific actions are worth-
while to pursue (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Although
these variants may differ in the underlying motives that
trigger imitation, they generally propose that organiza-
tions are more likely to adopt a practice if other organi-
zations have done so too (Turkulainen et al., 2017). In
this respect, we consider imitation to be present when
the practices used by the S1 with the S2 mirror the prac-
tices used by the buyer with the S1, without presuppos-
ing any particular form of decision making or
motivation underlying the imitative behavior (see also,
Greve, 1998).
While theory holds that imitative behaviors can take
many forms and may apply to various supply chain
management practices, it finds particular applicability in
practices that span organizational boundaries. Ketokivi
and Schroeder (2004) note that, when engaging in
mimicry, the imitator seldom has full access to the imita-
tee’s manufacturing system. This is, generally, the case
for any practice that is internally focused. However,
external or interorganizational practices, such as influ-
ence strategies (McFarland et al., 2008), supplier integra-
tion mechanisms (Turkulainen et al., 2017), or external
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performance measurement systems (Maestrini, Luzzini,
Maccarrone, & Caniato, 2017), are directly observable
and identifiable by supply chain members, such that
they more readily can serve as examples to be emulated.
In the context of this study, we concentrate on control
practices as the subject of imitation.
Control constitutes an important part of supply chain
management. Control is aimed at aligning buyer–sup-
plier interests and refers to the practices used by
exchange partners to manage risk in the supply chain
and to gain control over their cooperative activities
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Lumineau & Hen-
derson, 2012). In a buyer–supplier relationship, the
buyer is often thought to be the “controller” (the firm
exercising control) and the supplier the “controllee”
(the target of control) (Liu, 2015; Stouthuysen, Slab-
binck, & Roodhooft, 2012). Firms typically use a broad
portfolio of different control practices, consisting of for-
mal and informal controls (Bastl, Johnson, & Finne,
2019; Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, Samba-
murthy, Ko, & Purvis, 2002; Ouchi, 1979). Formal con-
trols can be subdivided into outcome and behavior
controls. Outcome controls focus on the measuring
and monitoring of results to be achieved, whereas
behavior controls are to ensure that the processes are
appropriate (Liu, 2015). Informal, or social, controls do
not specify outcome targets or desirable behaviors.
They instead focus on shared values and internalization
of goals and involve socialization activities, such as fre-
quent meetings and communications (Cousins & Men-
guc, 2006). Altogether, this means that the buyer firm
may use various formal and/or informal controls
toward the S1s as part of their day-to-day management.
These S1s, in turn, act as controllers toward their sup-
pliers. Being the “controllee” and the “controller” at the
same time, the S1 sits between the buyer and the S2,
allowing for the manifestation of imitative behavior.
From such a perspective, the context stretches beyond
the dyad, where the influence of the buyer is not limited
to the S1 but reaches the S2. Importantly, though, our
setting fits with the decentralized situation described in
Choi and Hong (2002), where the buyer delegates the
responsibility of managing the S2s to the S1. As such,
the buyer’s management practices may be used to
inform, but not dictate, practices usage further along in
the supply chain. That is, suppliers may decide to follow
or to model themselves after the buyer, such that similar-
ity among firms results. However, suppliers ultimately
have the latitude to choose their level of responsiveness
and to work with their own suppliers in an autonomous
way.
Against this background, actors in the network play
an active role in the diffusion of supply chain man-
agement practices, rather than being inert entities that
merely respond to inducements and constraints from
their network ties (Choi, Dooley, & Rungtusanatham,
2001; Tate et al., 2013). In connection with institu-
tional theory, we advance the argument that existing
buyer–supplier relationships—as institutions—not
only constrain and enable action but also actively ori-
ent it toward some possibilities over others; actors
nonetheless remain active agents capable of reflexivity
and deliberate decision making (cf. Cardinale, 2018;
Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). Accordingly, we
employ an active agency perspective, arguing that
when S1s are exposed to the buyer’s management
practices, S1s will vary in their imitative response.
More specifically, we propose that the S1’s imitation
of the buyer’s practices for use with the S2 is influ-
enced by their interpretation and perceptions of those
practices, which are shaped by two important factors:
the specific relational context and the external envi-
ronmental context. Our main argument is that,
whereas relational factors will influence suppliers’
mimetic tendencies by determining whom they will
imitate, environmental conditions will determine
when and what they imitate.
The existence of control practices imitation in buyer–
supplier–supplier triads has been documented in prior
research (Reusen & Stouthuysen, 2017), so it provides
an interesting set of practices that can be examined in
more detail to understand the determinants of imitative
behavior in such a setting. In what follows, we discuss
each of the identified contextual factors (i.e., relational
and environmental), and develop our hypotheses for
imitation as applied to the three types of control (i.e.,
outcome, behavior, and social). Other than previous
work that has treated imitation as the copying of an
entire set or portfolio of controls (Reusen & Stouthuy-
sen, 2017), we consider the imitation of each control
type separately, which accounts for the flexibility firms
have in copying some of the practices within the portfo-
lio and, most importantly, enables us to detect patterns
of selective imitation if they exist.
Relational Context
While there is wide acceptance of the idea that net-
works of relations influence imitative behavior, the insti-
tutional literature also suggests that organizations tend
to copy other organizations with whom they relate and
identify (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). In fact, given a firm’s
general imitation propensity, not all other firms’ prac-
tices are equal to the firm, and the concrete act of imita-
tion may depend on some features of their relational
context (Kostova & Roth, 2002). In supply chain rela-
tionships, the relational context that connects two firms
has been widely used to characterize exchange relation-
ships (Carey, Lawson, & Krause, 2011). This relational
context can be described by the level of affective commit-
ment. Affective commitment has been defined as a
party’s intention to continue an exchange relationship
based on positive regard for and attachment to the other
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party (Stanko, Bonner, & Calantone, 2007). Most studies
have focused on the relational context in dyadic relation-
ships (Kim & Henderson, 2015) and have not extended
its implications toward triadic relationships in supply
chains. We argue, however, that the level of affective
commitment in the first-level dyad may influence how
the second-level dyad is managed. If a relationship is
characterized by high affective commitment and firms
experience states of attachment and identification
toward another, then they are increasingly likely to dis-
play matching behaviors (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Specif-
ically, affective commitment often entails a desire to be
closely associated with a partner and thus may lead to a
greater willingness to resemble. Moreover, a firm that
identifies with a partner will likely share the values and
the beliefs of the partner embodied in the practice that is
being transferred. Together, these arguments suggest that
the level of attachment and common interests afforded
by affective commitment is likely to promote imitation
of practices along the supply chain.
Applied to our context, the higher the affective com-
mitment, as perceived by the S1, the higher the sup-
plier’s reliance on the buyer’s controls to manage the
relationships with its own suppliers. Since the buyer
firm typically uses a broad portfolio of controls on the
S1, this allows for the imitation of different types of
control, including outcome, behavior, and social con-
trols.
Thus, we predict the following:
H1a: The first-tier supplier’s affective commitment
toward the buyer is positively related to the
extent to which the first-tier supplier imitates
the buyer’s outcome controls for use with the sec-
ond-tier supplier.
H1b: The first-tier supplier’s affective commitment
toward the buyer is positively related to the
extent to which the first-tier supplier imitates
the buyer’s behavior controls for use with the sec-
ond-tier supplier.
H1c: The first-tier supplier’s affective commitment
toward the buyer is positively related to the
extent to which the first-tier supplier imitates
the buyer’s social controls for use with the sec-
ond-tier supplier.
Given that the impact of relational context is not prac-
tice-specific, we expect similar relational effects across
various practices. Yet while the above identification-
based imitation processes apply to any type of practice,
we expect the environmental conditions under which
firms operate to have an important bearing on the
appropriateness of the use and, by extension, the imita-
tion of specific practices, as elaborated on below.
Environmental Context
Building on early theoretical developments, a large
body of literature has assumed that uncertainty
enhances imitation (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). With
regard to supply chains, uncertainty is a key element
of the environmental context (Wong, Boon-Itt, &
Wong, 2011). More specifically, environmental uncer-
tainty refers to the degree to which firms’ external
environment in terms of its competitors’ actions, tech-
nology, and consumer tastes and preferences is charac-
terized by an absence of pattern, unpredictability, and
unexpected change (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984).
These unpredictabilities and sudden changes in the
external environment result in a high information
processing demand for firms. In such situations, firms
are particularly likely to be receptive to information
implicit in the actions of others (Lieberman & Asaba,
2006). In other words, firms who perceive high levels
of environmental uncertainty may be more motivated
to look at other firms for some assurance about how
to act. In our setting, this implies that, under condi-
tions of uncertainty, the supplier would be more
likely to follow the buyer’s management practices for
use in interactions with its own suppliers.
However, whereas environmental conditions may
create the uncertainty that typically drives imitation,
by its own nature uncertainty also constrains the use
of particular supply chain management practices,
thereby limiting imitation potential. Organizational
contingency theory has recognized the importance of
contextual factors and the implausibility of a single
“best practice” approach (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967). More recently, scholars also called for a contin-
gent application of supply chain management prac-
tices, with environmental uncertainty constituting an
important contingency factor (e.g., Sousa & Voss,
2008). Prior research, for example, has identified
environmental complexity and dynamism as impor-
tant external contingencies that in part determine the
feasibility of specific flexibility strategies (Ketokivi,
2006). Also, while supply chain integration is often
considered as a tool to cope with uncertainty, it has
been voiced that supply chain integration is not uni-
versally beneficial and that its value is contingent on
environmental context (Flynn, Koufteros, & Lu, 2016;
Wong et al., 2011). The main point is that certain
practices are more appropriate than others in dealing
with the uncertainties a specific firm is confronted
with. In the context of control design, Spekle (2001)
likewise pointed to uncertainty as a contextual factor
that needs to be considered, suggesting that control
devices should be tailored to the realities of the envir-
onment, particularly emphasizing the importance of
maintaining sufficient flexibility to allow for adapta-
tion to events as they unfold.
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Thus, on the one hand, the institutional argument
suggests that reliance on imitation increases with
environmental uncertainty but, on the other hand,
uncertainty also inhibits the use and effectiveness of
management practices that are ill-suited to inherently
uncertain environments, resulting in the paradoxical
situation of higher rates of imitation under less desir-
able conditions.
It is thus worthwhile investigating whether suppliers
account for environmental uncertainty as an impor-
tant relevance criterion in their imitation decisions.
Prior research has introduced the notion of reflective
imitation, indicating that practices previously adopted
by others are influential only if those practices are per-
ceived as relevant (Greve, 1998; Li, Qian, & Yao,
2015). Therefore, starting from the S1’s identification-
based imitative tendency, we further expand our
model by considering how the relationship between
affective commitment and imitation is moderated by
environmental uncertainty. Since the three types of
control are differentially suitable to handle environ-
mental uncertainty (Harmancioglu, 2009; Langfield-
Smith, 2008), and adhering to the contingency logic
and active agency perspective, it is reasonable to
expect that it will impact the imitation of each control
type accordingly.
When firms are faced with high levels of uncer-
tainty, it is particularly difficult to specify outcomes
to be realized and to monitor the achievement of
these performance targets. If desired outcomes can-
not be clearly articulated and accurately measured,
outcome controls will not be useful (Das & Teng,
2001; Kirsch et al., 2002; Langfield-Smith, 2008).
The relevance of outcome controls, thus, clearly
depends on the level of environmental uncertainty.
Considering that, when exposed to the buyer’s con-
trols, S1s act as active agents, we propose that they
will take these relevance considerations into account
in their imitation decisions. Under conditions of
uncertainty, outcome controls would be viewed by
the S1 as inappropriate or ineffective for the particu-
lar situation and would logically result in a lower
propensity to imitate. In other words, for outcome
controls, we expect that the buyer’s influence in the
form of identification-based imitation is weaker
under conditions of environmental uncertainty.
Compared to outcome controls, behavior controls
are considered to be more effective under conditions
of uncertainty. Directly managing and coordinating
suppliers’ activities through the use of behavior con-
trols might be better suited to deal with the uncer-
tainties, because it focuses on the processes rather
than on the outcome itself (Das & Teng, 2001;
Kirsch et al., 2002; Langfield-Smith, 2008). The diffi-
culty of setting performance criteria in advance and
effectively evaluating achieved performance in rapidly
changing and uncertain environments, as such, does
not significantly handicap behavioral controls. In
applying this line of thought to the imitation of
behavior controls, we again follow the argument that
the S1s’ relevance judgments will determine their
imitative behavior. The notion that behavior controls
are valuable under conditions of uncertainty, com-
bined with the widespread idea that uncertainty
makes others’ actions and practices more influential
in guiding decision making, leads us to propose a
higher tendency to imitate. More specifically, for
behavior controls, we expect that environmental
uncertainty will strengthen the buyer’s influence in
the form of identification-based imitation.
Besides, firms may rely on informal or social con-
trols in uncertain situations. Scholars have indicated
that social controls provide the flexibility to deal with
the inevitable uncertainties that arise in interfirm rela-
tionships (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Social controls are not expli-
citly designed, but entail the alignment of goals
through socialization activities. They allow the part-
ners to move forward with a less fully specified con-
tract or less strict monitoring under the assumption
that contingencies will be addressed in good faith.
Since social controls are particularly appropriate to
the situation, and uncertainty is generally thought to
foster imitation, S1s would be more inclined to imi-
tate these controls in the presence of uncertainty. As
such, for social controls, we expect that environmental
uncertainty will strengthen the buyer’s influence in the
form of identification-based imitation.
Together, this leads to the following hypotheses:
H2a: The relationship between the first-tier supplier’s
affective commitment toward the buyer and the
first-tier supplier’s imitation of the buyer’s out-
come controls for use with the second-tier sup-
plier will be weakened by environmental
uncertainty.
H2b: The relationship between the first-tier supplier’s
affective commitment toward the buyer and the
first-tier supplier’s imitation of the buyer’s beha-
vior controls for use with the second-tier supplier
will be strengthened by environmental uncer-
tainty.
H2c: The relationship between the first-tier supplier’s
affective commitment toward the buyer and the
first-tier supplier’s imitation of the buyer’s social
controls for use with the second-tier supplier will
be strengthened by environmental uncertainty.
In summary, both relational and environmental fac-
tors suggest testable hypotheses relevant to predicting
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the occurrence of imitation across the supply chain.
The key premise of our predictions is that relational
context and environmental context interact with each
other when influencing the imitation of supply chain
management practices and that this influence differs
depending on the specific practice under considera-
tion.
SAMPLE DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
We collected survey data from partner firms working
together in close buyer–supplier relationships. In par-
ticular, we study a vertical supply chain consisting of
three members (i.e., buyer–supplier–supplier triads).
We gained the cooperation of a buyer firm—a large,
Fortune 500, consumer goods manufacturer that out-
sources various production and service functions. In
this setting, it is common for S1s, in turn, to out-
source to one or more S2s, which provides a good
context for investigating imitative behavior. Especially
because the buyer is regarded as an organization of
high prestige, it likely serves as a role model for other
companies upstream in the supply chain. Previous
research has shown that organizations tend to imitate
the practices of firms with certain traits, such as large
size, high prestige, or good performance that give
them confidence in imitation (Haunschild & Miner,
1997). Because the buyer in our setting exhibits these
traits, it presents a good candidate to be imitated. Our
research setting thus provides both the necessary net-
work conditions and the motivational context for imi-
tation to take place.
Our research design involves a multilevel effort, with
data collected from two parties in the supply chain
network (i.e., the buyer’s S1s and S2s). First, we
obtained contact information of S1 principals for a
random selection of 1,000 S1s from the buyer’s sup-
plier database. These S1 principals are the buyer’s pri-
mary contacts and are typically boundary-spanning
supply chain managers who perform important func-
tions with respect to relationship management. In
general, boundary spanners are individuals responsi-
ble for the management of the firm’s business rela-
tionships by representing their own firm and
frequently interacting with boundary spanners at part-
ner firms. The S1 principals, thus, constitute an
important link in the triad and tend to be more clo-
sely involved in these relationships than other mem-
bers of the organization. As such, they are not only
considered to be qualified respondents, they are also
in the right position to identify the S2s. We asked
each S1 principal surveyed to select at least three S2s
with whom they had recently done business. We then
asked the S2 informants to respond to all questions
using their relationship with the S1 as the context.
This procedure ensured that we obtained matching
triads.
The survey was mailed to the target respondents dur-
ing the spring of 2012. We sent emails with one set of
survey questionnaires to the S1s and another set to the
S2s. We re-sent the survey questionnaire to nonrespon-
ders approximately one month after the initial mail-
ing. We received 61 S1 responses and 96 S2 responses.
To evaluate informant quality, we had respondents
assess their ability to respond to the questionnaire
items, their level of involvement with the partner firm,
and their knowledge of their firm’s dealings with the
partner firm. On a five-point scale, the average scores
for the S1 informants on these questions were 3.97
(s.d. = .35) and 4.07 (s.d. = .37) considering their
relationship with the buyer and their own suppliers,
respectively. The survey instrument for the S2s likewise
included informant quality checks, specifically related
to their firm’s dealings with the S1 who identified
them. We excluded 2 S2 respondents with a low score
on all three informant quality questions. The average
informant quality score for the remaining S2 infor-
mants was 3.91 (s.d. = .44). We further eliminated 1
S2 response because of missing data. This left 61
usable S1 responses and 93 usable S2 responses. The
S2 respondents named 60 of the contacted S1s. Of
those 60, multiple responses were received for 13 S1s
(i.e., ranging from 2 to 8 S2 responses for a single S1).
We treated these cases where two or more S2s identi-
fied the same S1 as one-to-one unique relationships.
Notably, out of the 93 usable S2 responses, 2 S2s
could not be matched to an S1. As such, matching of
the buyer, S1 responses, and S2 responses resulted in
complete data for 91 triads. Figure 2 summarizes the
data collection and matching process. Table 1 presents
the key sample characteristics of all S1 and S2 firms
(i.e., S1 age, S1 size, S1 location, S1 and S2 industry).
Consistent with the diverse nature of the buyer’s
supplier base, the age of the S1s in the sample ranges
from 2 to 179 years, with an average of 47 years. The
sample covers small to large S1 firms, although most
of the respondents came from medium-sized to large
firms with more than 500 employees. The majority of
the surveyed S1s are located in North America and
Europe, reflecting the buyer’s global operations. In
terms of industry sector, the S1 and S2 responses
relate to multiple industry groups. The industry classi-
fication in the survey questionnaire was based on
two-digit SIC codes, belonging to four general indus-
try groups—namely, manufacturing, transportation,
finance and real estate, and services. The data indicate
that the industries in our sample are representative of
the functions primarily outsourced by the buyer, with
the largest representation by manufacturing and ser-
vice sectors, respectively.
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MEASURES AND VALIDATION
Scales used to measure the constructs were drawn
from the available literature. Table 2 summarizes the
scale items used for the dependent variables. Table 3
summarizes the scale items of the independent and
control variables. Table 4 reports summary statistics
and correlations for all variables in our model.
Dependent Variables
We examine control practices imitation in the form
of upstream control similarity between the buyer and
the S1 and between the S1 and the S2. Previous stu-
dies have relied on similarity scores to investigate imi-
tative behavior, given that imitation is manifested by
greater similarity between firms’ practices (e.g., McFar-
land et al., 2008; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001).
Based on the existing literature, we construct a list of
different practices to exercise control (e.g., Choudhury
& Sabherwal, 2003; Cousins & Menguc, 2006; Dekker,
2004; Liu, 2015; Mahama, 2006; Mouritsen, Hansen,
& Hansen, 2001; Stouthuysen et al., 2012). We
include both formal and informal controls and, more
specifically, control practices that reflect the three con-
trol types: outcome, behavior, and social. All
responses use a five-point scale, ranging from “used
not at all” to “used extensively.” We ask the S1s to
rate the extent to which the buyer used specific con-
trol practices toward them, and we ask the S2s to rate
the extent to which the S1 used specific control prac-
tices toward them.
Similarity of use for each control type is determined
by Equation 1, which is derived from Westphal et al.
(2001) and McFarland et al. (2008) and adapted to
our study context. We take the absolute difference
between the control practices used by the buyer
toward the S1 (CB) and the control practices used by
the S1 toward the S2 (CS) and convert this into a
similarity score by subtracting it from the highest
value possible. Higher scores indicate greater imitative
use of the particular type of control.
yi ¼ 5 CBij  CSij



 ð1Þ
where
i = control type identifier, 1–3;
j = triad identifier, 1–91.
Independent Variables
Environmental uncertainty refers to the degree to
which the S1’s external environment in terms of its
competitors’ actions, technology, and consumer tastes
and preferences is characterized by an absence of pat-
tern, unpredictability, and unexpected change. To
measure environmental uncertainty, we use a multi-
item scale adapted from Srinivasan, Mukherjee, and
Gaur (2011). Affective commitment reflects the S1’s
desire to continue the relationship because of the pos-
itive affect toward and identification with the buyer.
We measure affective commitment using a multi-item
scale developed by Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp
(1995). The independent variables reflect the S1’s per-
spective, as the S1’s perceptions are considered to be
the most important predictors of their imitative
behavior.
Control Variables
We control for sample characteristics such as S1’s
firm age (i.e., number of years since the foundation of
the firm) and size (i.e., a dummy variable with num-
ber of employees larger than 1,000 or less than or
equal to 1,000). It has been shown that a lower level
of experience might lead to greater imitative behavior
(e.g., Henisz & Delios, 2001; Li et al., 2015) and that
FIGURE 2
Data Collection Overview.
Buyer S161 usable responses a
Match 
(one or more S2 
responses for 60 S1s) 
Complete triadic data for 91 unique triads  
(1 buyer, 1 S1 and 1 S2 per triad) 
S2  
93 usable responses b
aOut of the 61 Usable S1 Responses, 1 S1 Could Not Be Matched to a S2. bOut of the 93 Usable S2 Responses, 2 S2s Could Not Be
Matched to an S1
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organizations are more likely to imitate the strategies
of their size peers (e.g., Haveman, 1993; Turkulainen
et al., 2017). We also control for relationship duration
and contact frequency between the buyer and S1, as
these might indicate strong ties and influence the
occurrence of imitation. Relationship duration is oper-
ationalized as a single-item measure that asks S1s to
indicate the number of years and months they have
worked with the buyer. Contact frequency measures
the perceived level of interaction between the buyer
and S1. This multi-item measure is based on Doney
and Cannon (1997).
We include dependence as a control variable to iso-
late the effects of our theorized variables from con-
founding influences due to coercion. A powerful
buyer may coercively push specific practices to be
adopted in the supply chain (e.g., Tate et al., 2013;
Zsidisin et al., 2005). In this case, suppliers are
required to comply with the demands of the domi-
nant buyer, creating sameness throughout the supply
chain that is not the result of imitation. Therefore, we
control for situations where coercion would be more
plausible, such as when the supplier is highly depen-
dent on the buyer. Dependence is operationalized as
a single-item measure asking the S1 to report the per-
centage of total sales accounted for by the buyer firm,
as commonly done in the literature (e.g., Carey et al.,
2011; Pandit, Wasley, & Zach, 2011). We use the nat-
ural logarithm in our model.
What looks like imitation may also be firms’ inde-
pendent responses to a common external stimulus.
Similar control may, for instance, be shaped by a
common cultural context. Scholars have noted differ-
ent preferences for certain types of control in various
countries (e.g., Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010). While the
buyer’s headquarters in our study are in the United
TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics
Average Values
Age S1
(Number of Years)
47.00
Frequency in Sample Percentage of Sample
S1 (n = 60)
Size S1 (number of employees)
<100 2 3.3
100–500 9 15.0
501–1,000 11 18.3
>1,000 34 56.7
Unknown 4 6.7
Location S1
Africa 1 1.7
Asia 2 3.3
Australia 0 0
Europe 16 26.7
North America 40 66.7
South America 1 1.7
Industry sector S1
Manufacturing 40 66.7
Transportation 4 6.7
Finance and real estate 1 1.7
Services 12 20.0
Multiple 3 5.0
S2 (n = 91)
Industry sector S2
Manufacturing 53 58.2
Transportation 9 9.9
Finance and real estate 0 0
Services 29 31.9
Multiple 0 0
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States, we collect data from S1s from different geo-
graphical regions. We constructed a dummy variable
equaling 1 if the S1 is also located in the United
States and 0 if the S1 is located elsewhere. Besides
location, we control for industry similarity between
the buyer, the S1, and the S2, because this might also
have a positive influence on the similarity of control
usage. Firms operating in the same or similar
TABLE 3
Independent and Control Variable Scale Items
Affective commitmenta
Even if we could we would not drop the buyer firm because we like being associated with them
We want to continue as a supplier of the buyer firm because we genuinely enjoy our relationship
with them
Our positive feelings toward the buyer firm are a major reason we continue to work with them
Environmental uncertaintya
The rate at which products/services are becoming obsolete in the industry is very fast
Actions by competitors are hard to predict
Demand and consumer tastes are hard to predict
The production technology in this industry changes fast
Technological advances in this industry are hard to predict
Consumer demand for our products/services is very unstable
Contact frequencya
The buyer firm’s personnel often visit our place of business
The buyer firm’s personnel make more calls than those of other client firms
The buyer firm’s personnel spend considerable time getting to know our people
Relationship duration
Length of relationship with buyer firm: . . . years and . . . months
Dependence
Percentage of total sales from buyer firm: . . . %
All measures reported by S1.
aItems measured on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”).
TABLE 2
Control Practices Scale Items
Outcome controla
Open book accounting to create transparency in supplier’s results
Financial incentive system in the form of benefit sharing
Information systems designed to help monitoring the outputs delivered by the supplier
Behavior controla
Information systems designed to help monitoring behavior of the supplier
Joint alliance board serving as an authority structure in which both partners have control over the
activities performed
Interorganizational chart to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the partners in the relationship
Task groups including employees of both partners to carry out the activities and to facilitate and
monitor the processes
Social controla
Face-to-face communication to help establish shared norms and beliefs
Joint task groups or cross-functional teams including employees of both partners to enhance shared
decision making and goal setting
Regular joint meetings to understand the relationship’s goals, values, and norms
Workshops and training practices to stimulate shared understandings and common goals
Buyer’s use of control practices toward S1s is reported by S1s, and S1s’ use of control practices toward S2s is reported by S2s.
aItems measured on a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = “used not at all” and 5 = “used extensively”).
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industries often use similar approaches to control
(e.g., Davila, 2005). We created a categorical variable
that reflects the degree of similarity between buyer,
S1, and S2 industry, constructed as follows: firms
sharing the same 2-digit SIC code, being the most
similar, were coded four; firms sharing the same 1-
digit but not the same 2-digit SIC were coded three;
firms were coded two when they did not share the
same 1- or 2-digit SIC but shared the same general
SIC category; and if the firms shared none of these
industry similarities, the variable was coded one.
Measurement Validation
The measurement validation involved multiple steps,
subjecting multi-item measures to a systematic assess-
ment of unidimensionality, reliability, and validity.
More details are provided in Appendix S1, including
measurement model estimates, item loadings, and
construct reliabilities. For each multi-item construct,
we calculated individual scores as mean scores of the
combined scale items to be used in the analyses.
Furthermore, we note that since our survey research
design effectively deals with common method bias
through careful survey design ex ante, testing or con-
trolling for it ex post is unneeded. Our survey research
design, in fact, reduces the risk of common method
bias by following recommendations from the litera-
ture, such as obtaining measures of the predictor and
criterion variables from different sources, protecting
respondent anonymity, and reducing evaluation
apprehension (Flynn, Pagell, & Fugate, 2018; Pod-
sakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Since part
of our key variables is not self-reported, we were also
able to eliminate problems associated with self-serving
biases.
ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Hypothesis Tests
To test the hypotheses, we conduct hierarchical
regression analysis with ordinary least squares (OLS),
incrementally adding the variables of interest and
their interactions. Each variable was mean-centered
before producing the interaction terms in order to
minimize potential multicollinearity. We also calcu-
lated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each
regression coefficient. All scores are lower than 2.5
and thus within acceptable levels.
We estimate separate regression models for the imi-
tation of outcome, behavior, and social controls.
Model 1 presents the base model, which includes only
the control variables. Model 2 adds the main effects
of our theoretical variables of interest, namely affec-
tive commitment and environmental uncertainty.
Model 3 introduces the interaction term between
affective commitment and environmental uncertainty.
Table 5 reports the regression results, along with
statistics for the incremental changes in explanatory
power.
As can be seen for each type of control, when add-
ing our two predictor variables, the model shows a
significant increase in R-squared, as compared with
the model’s respective baseline, suggesting that these
variables contribute significantly in explaining imita-
tive control use.
As a first step in our analysis, Model 2 is used to
examine whether identification-based imitation is
occurring. More specifically, testing for the effect of
affective commitment, we find the predicted positive
relation with imitation. That is, we find a positive sig-
nificant relation with imitation of outcome controls
(b = .207; P < .10) and social controls (b = .230;
P < .05), although the effect did not reach significance
for behavior control imitation (b = .080; P > .10).
These results provide empirical support for H1a and
H1c, whereas we do not find evidence to support
hypothesis H1b. While it appears that affective commit-
ment favors the imitation of outcome and social con-
trols rather than behavior controls, the results broadly
confirm the logic of identification-based imitation.
Next, we examine the moderating impact of envi-
ronmental uncertainty on such identification-based
imitation, as presented in Model 3. We predicted that
uncertainty would weaken the effect of affective com-
mitment for outcome controls, whereas it would
strengthen the effect for behavior controls. However,
looking at the results, the addition of the interaction
term does not increase explained variance and the
interaction terms are not significant. Therefore, H2a
nor H2b are supported. The results do reveal a signifi-
cant main effect for environmental uncertainty. The
effect of environmental uncertainty is negative for out-
come control imitation (b = .285; P < .05), but pos-
itive for behavior control imitation (b = .391;
P < .01), as we would expect. Turning to the effects
on social control imitation, the model shows a signifi-
cant increase in explained variance and shows a signif-
icant yet negative interaction term between affective
commitment and environmental uncertainty
(b = .211; P < .05). This indicates that as the level
of environmental uncertainty increases, the positive
relationship between affective commitment and social
control imitation becomes weaker, rather than stron-
ger, inconsistent with H2c.
Additional Analyses
In this section, we report results of additional tests
that extend the above findings and estimate an
alternative specification to evaluate the robustness of
our results.
Subsample tests. In order to further gauge the occur-
rence of imitation, we conduct a follow-up analysis
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building on the idea that firms attend to, and are
influenced by, the actions of similar others more than
dissimilar others. Previous studies have found, for
example, that industry similarity enhances firms’ sensi-
tivity to other firms’ actions (e.g., Henisz & Delios,
2001; Huang, Gattiker, & Schroeder, 2010). Thus,
while our previous model incorporates a direct link to
control for industry similarity, industrial context could
also function as a key moderator of imitation. We
therefore explore whether industry similarity influ-
ences the strength of our proposed imitation effects,
as described in Appendix S2.
The observations regarding industry similarity are
theoretically consistent with imitation as a key driver
of our findings, as the effects are more pronounced in
subsamples in which we would expect the effects to
be stronger. That is, the tendency to imitate is stron-
ger when the triad shares observable characteristics—
here, industrial context, which likely reflects the
relevance and transferability of the practices under
consideration.
Alternative imitation measure. We estimate the
regression model with an alternative, more direct, imi-
tation measure as dependent variable. Although the
alternative measure only assessed control practices
imitation as a whole, without specifying the specific
type of control, it allows for a robustness test of the
impact of the proposed contextual factors on the
occurrence of imitation. The measurement details and
results are presented in Appendix S3.
Since we obtain similar patterns of results when
regressing the control variables (which are generally
expected to be associated with imitative behavior) on
the direct imitation measure and the similarity mea-
sures, this raises confidence that the similarity measures
are picking up imitation effects. In addition, the signifi-
cant values for increases in R-squared and associated F-
statistics as compared to the base model indicate that
our predictor variables are important in explaining imi-
tation. The results confirm the existence of identifica-
tion-based imitation, with greater imitative use
in situations where the supplier is more committed to
the buyer firm. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe
that, for the direct measure of imitation, the interaction
effect between affective commitment and environmen-
tal uncertainty is positive and significant.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This research develops and tests a model on the
conditions under which supply chain management
practices imitation in a multitier supply network is
likely to take place. Using a unique data set of ver-
tically linked buyer–supplier–supplier triads, the
study provides novel evidence on the occurrence of
supply chain management practices imitation and
makes both academic and managerial relevant con-
tributions.
By investigating the occurrence of imitation, this
study contributes to multitier supply chain research in
moving beyond the traditional dyadic perspective. Fol-
lowing earlier calls (e.g., Carter, Rogers & Choi,
2015a; Mena et al., 2013), we adopt a multilevel per-
spective, specifically acknowledging that the effects of
firm behavior are not confined to dyadic relationships
and that interactions between vertically connected
dyads are important to consider. The study further
contributes to existing literature by taking a more con-
textual approach in understanding imitative behavior
in supply chains. Studying the impact of relational
and environmental contextual factors, and distinguish-
ing among different types of management practices,
we provide evidence not only about whom and when
firms in the supply chain imitate, but also about what
they imitate under specific conditions.
In general, we find that the relational context, and
the affective nature of the relationship between the
buyer and the supplier in particular, stimulates imita-
tion of control practices. More specifically, when sup-
pliers feel committed to the buyer and identified with
it to a greater extent, we observe higher levels of imi-
tation. As commitment proves to be an important
determinant of imitation, this supports the argument
that imitation in supply chains is not devoid of affect
and complements prior network research (e.g., Tate
et al., 2013) suggesting that organizations are more
influenced by others they are more strongly tied to
and about whom they have positive sentiments.
With regard to the environmental context, we find
distinct effects for each control type. The interaction
of environmental uncertainty with affective commit-
ment fails to produce a significant effect for outcome
and behavior control imitation. Yet the opposing
main effects of environmental uncertainty on outcome
and behavior controls, generally, support the idea that
mimetic influence depends on relevance judgments.
Moreover, we find that environmental uncertainty
attenuates, rather than fosters, identification-based
imitation of social controls, particularly when operat-
ing in dissimilar industries. The main conclusion from
these results is that uncertainty does seem to matter
for imitation, with the nuance that it affects imitation
of specific practices differently, depending on its imi-
tative content.
Taken together, this study adds to extant imitation
studies by (1) providing concrete evidence on how
firms’ attachment and identification toward another
affects the transfer of organizational practices in sup-
ply chains and (2) by advancing a contingency
approach of imitation, emphasizing that imitation is
not a context-independent choice. In doing so, the
study not only enriches our understanding of the use
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and adoption of supply chain management practices,
but also contributes to two emerging line of thoughts
in institutional theory.
First, we extend prior work suggesting that uncer-
tainty and imitation relate in ways that are more
complicated than commonly assumed (Gaba & Ter-
laak, 2013). Going back to the origins of institu-
tional theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
associated the mechanisms of mimesis primarily with
uncertainty. Yet while environmental uncertainty is a
factor widely theorized to enhance imitation, also in
supply chains (e.g., Kauppi, 2013), at the same time,
contingency research has identified environmental
uncertainty as an important contextual factor that
may affect the effectiveness of a best practice (Sousa
& Voss, 2008). No research to date, however, has
considered integrating both of these perspectives. The
notion that mimetic behavior increases with uncer-
tainty has, in fact, been widely interpreted to apply
generally. Our study is the first of which we are
aware to theorize about and distinguish between the
impact of environmental uncertainty on the imitation
of practices that are differentially suitable to deal
with uncertainty. The broader implication is that, to
arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of
how uncertainty drives imitation, it is critical to con-
sider the content and application of the practices
being copied.
Second, the apparently selective copying highlights
the role of active agency on the side of the imitating
firms. Although suppliers are exposed to the entire set
of controls used by the buyer, our results suggest that
efficiency-seeking behavior will still guide the firm’s
evaluation of different types of control and that some
rational calculation is involved in imitation. This con-
clusion resonates with the assertion that imitation is
not always as “irrational” as sometimes presumed by
institutional theory (Turkulainen et al., 2017). Rather
than viewing imitation as a mindless process by
which organizations unconditionally imitate each
other, our findings indicate that organizations imitat-
ing controls do this in a careful way. To the best of
our knowledge, these observations represent the first
empirical evidence suggesting that suppliers do not
imitate buyer’s practices indiscriminately, but do so
with thoughtful consideration of the conditions they
are facing and the specificities of the practices at issue.
With this, our study moves toward a blended institu-
tional perspective, as advocated, among others, by
Cardinale (2018) and Kostova et al. (2008), where
the broad concepts of social embeddedness of organi-
zations are intertwined with the ideas of active
agency.
While the evidence of this study is limited to the
spread of control practices, the insights that emerge
from it are relevant to developing further understanding
of the diffusion or imitation of other supply chain man-
agement practices that are impacted by uncertainty, such
as manufacturing flexibility strategies (Ketokivi, 2006),
lean principles and practices (Browning & Heath,
2009), and supply chain integration mechanisms
(Wong et al., 2011). Our findings also open up interest-
ing avenues for more nuanced explorations of factors
that are commonly believed to influence imitation.
Considering different types of supply chain uncertainty
(Flynn, et al., 2016), for instance, could help to provide
further clarity on the notions of choice and deliberate-
ness in imitation.
This study has important practical implications as
well. To fulfill their objectives, organizations must be
able to keep their supply chain under control and
manage processes that extend beyond their bound-
aries. However, given the level of complexity that sup-
ply networks might reach, it would not be possible or
desirable for any one firm to manage the whole of it.
As supply chain managers struggle with what and
what not to manage (Choi et al., 2001; Choi & Wu,
2009b; Maestrini et al., 2017), this study hints at
potential indirect benefits resulting from suppliers’
imitative tendencies. That is, being part of a network,
firms may have good reasons for their supply chain
management practices to be imitated and passed on
along the chain. By understanding the occurrence of
imitation and the determinants thereof, firms could
maximize chances for imitation when it is indeed
desired that practices spread in this manner. Our
results suggest, for instance, that suppliers often do
not internalize or diffuse ideas and practices from a
buyer with whom they do not feel somehow associ-
ated. As such, building strong and committed
exchange relationships would be particularly instruc-
tive for the purpose of encouraging and assisting sup-
plier firms to adopt relevant management practices.
Again, such strategies do not only pertain to control
practices, but reasonably apply to any practice that
could be diffused across the supply network.
To conclude, we must recognize the limitations of
this study, at the same time pointing at opportunities
for further research to extend and further validate our
findings. First, our study is effectively a single quanti-
tative case study of imitation in the supply chain of
one buyer. In addition, while we believe the S1s are
representative of the buyer firm’s supply base, the
response rate and sample size are small and there
may be other biases we are unaware of. The same
would hold for the S2 respondents. Hence, future
research will need to explore imitation in other con-
texts with larger and more representative samples that
can generalize to other networks.
Another limitation relates to the measures. We view
our examination of imitation as an important step in
the development of this construct, but see several
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possibilities for future theoretical and empirical refine-
ment. We attempted to compile a list of very specific
control practices in order to have good coverage and
to better capture the phenomenon of imitation. While
the development of the control constructs was
strongly grounded in the literature, its validation
pointed to some weaknesses, and we acknowledge
that the scale items may require modifications in
future studies.
The results based on similarity scores for our depen-
dent variables should also be interpreted with caution.
To the extent possible, we have examined rival expla-
nations of positive evidence for similarity between
control practices, exploring the impact of tied firms
having similar cultural backgrounds or experiencing
similar industry conditions. We must acknowledge
that other, more specific, features of the transaction
context, if similar across tiers, may also affect control
practices similarity. Future research aimed at uncover-
ing imitation needs to account for relevant similarities
in context as a potential alternative contributor to the
observed similarities in practices usage.
To increase confidence that our similarity measure is
capturing imitation, we provide a number of addi-
tional analyses and robustness checks. Since the
observed effects are theoretically consistent with imita-
tive use of controls and are highly comparable with
those of the alternative, more direct measure of imita-
tion, this provides substantial corroborating evidence
for the envisaged concepts of imitation. The cross-sec-
tional nature of the data may still pose constraints,
however, when it comes to more detailed and
dynamic analyses of how control choices affect each
other. Our main tests are essentially based on the pre-
mise that the buyer’s controls affect the supplier’s con-
trols, with affective commitment and environmental
uncertainty as determinants. We acknowledge that it
is challenging to establish causality in this research
and that potential endogeneity issues could bias
regression results. Future longitudinal investigations
would be particularly insightful to further validate our
results, better accounting for potential endogeneity
and strengthening causal inference.
Finally, while we adopt a triadic study design, investi-
gating how the buyer–supplier relationship influences
the supplier–supplier relationship, a logical extension
would be to consider whether the presence of direct
connections between the buyer and the supplier’s sup-
plier would influence the dynamics. Additional insight
could also be gained by further expanding the unit of
analysis. For example, pointing to the wider network of
relationships, how far imitation reverberates in the sup-
ply chain remains an interesting issue for further inves-
tigation. Moreover, if suppliers manage to copy
practices in an appropriate way, a multitiered manage-
ment system may result in improved efficiency and
enhanced supply chain orchestration. While perfor-
mance implications are beyond the present study’s
scope, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to
examine the link between the imitation of practices and
supply chain performance.
All in all, this research sheds light on the occurrence
of practices imitation in multitier supply chains. It pro-
vides a first step in unveiling deliberateness and selec-
tivity in imitative behavior and lays the foundation for
the development of a contingency theory of imitation.
We hope it will guide future research on supply chain
management in new and interesting directions.
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